Scotland's Security

A traditional narrow focus on “defence” issues is not appropriate for Scotland, nor indeed for any country given 21st century challenges. The armed forces have to be placed in the context of new security challenges and the responses required, including the value of investing in soft power as in the case of Ireland. There are some initiatives that can be taken now by the Scottish Government that are both useful in themselves and create a bridge to the institutions of an independent state. Creating a Secure Scotland Commission and upgrading the status of the intelligence centre at the Scottish Crime Campus at Gartcosh to a “provisional” or “pre-natal” Scottish Security and Intelligence Agency would be viable initiatives within the current devolved powers. In summary:

• ● Cyber security issues are clearly emerging as a priority and we have in the proposed SSIA a practical plan for that.
• ● Coastal protection is a higher priority for Scotland than the rUK and is likely to increase in significance. It has been neglected and requires a substantial increase in off-shore patrol vessels and personnel.
• ● The proposed SDF should be designed for flexibility with a modest core capability that can be adapted to changed circumstances. We do not need the current UK's major hardware designed for a global interventionist role. The SDF's cost will be substantially less than that assigned to Scotland currently by the UK Government.
• ● Nuclear weapons and Faslane/Coulport are dominant risk issues and will be a major challenge in transition negotiations. Statements of opposition to nuclear weapons are worthy but meaningless unless accompanied by a very clear plan with a tight timetable for their removal. Work has already been done on this and Scotland's position will be greatly strengthened by the TPNW.
• Scottish Independence Convention Transition Paper No. 2