How do we ensure national security in an independent Scotland?
Is Scotland going to be safe after independence?
Every country in the world faces potential threats to domestic security and an independent Scotland will be no different. It is important that Scotland is properly prepared to deal with those threats if they arise and so an effective national security plan should be established during the transition period.
So what are the threats and how do we deal with them?
The biggest threats to national security are not military threats. Cyber attacks are much, much more likely than military attacks and so cyber security is a priority. The threat from criminal activity or terrorism (both domestic and international) is also significantly greater than the military threat. And potentially greatest among them all is the threat of serious damage to key national infrastructure from climate change and environmental crisis. Of course Scotland must be able to defend its borders but the threat of a direct territorial threat is minimal. From there it is a matter of the choices of governments subsequently elected, but it seems unlikely that Scotland will want to develop an aggressive offensive military position like that of the UK, meaning direct military operations overseas would be limited to participating in UN peacekeeping initiatives. A strategy for each is needed.
How do we deal with cyber security, crime and terrorism?
These are primarily criminal issues and should be the remit of a Scottish Security and Intelligence Agency, which would be located in the police service. This would be the primary means of monitoring organised crime, cyber attacks and, working closely with the Borders and Customs Agency, incursions into Scotland's territory (such as smuggling). It would have units dealing with all the different forms of intelligence-gathering but would be under civilian oversight. It would immediately seek to develop positive sharing relationships with the intelligence agencies of other countries. It would also house a National Cyber Security Agency, a specialist body dealing with cyber crime, including cyber attacks from foreign governments.
If the intelligence agency is monitoring threats, how do we counter them?
Much of the threat is from organised crime or is in the form of other illegal activity. The Scottish Security and Intelligence Agency would be housed in the police service and it would be a police matter to intervene and enforce in most occasions. Where the activity is offshore it would be the Borders and Customs agency, properly equipped with intercept ships, which would take action. Political decisions and strategy would be made in a Department of National Security and it would all be overseen by a National Security Committee of the Scottish Parliament.
But we'll need armed forces, right?
Yes, a nation has to be able to defend its borders and Scotland will want to be able to contribute to UN peacekeeping initiatives. But that is not the only role an armed forces might have; the other big threat (climate change) can create civil emergencies which may need a response and deploying an army may be a key contributor to that. It is unlikely, however, that Scotland will want to fight offensive wars. This means that defence spending is likely to be significantly lower than the UK. But building up an army is not something you can do overnight – in fact, it is the one major task which cannot be completed within the three-year transition period and will probably take about ten years to build up what would be known as the Scottish Defence Force.
So how do we build an army?
It may be that Scottish service men and women currently serving in the British Armed Forces may want to transfer to a Scottish Defence Force but this certainly can't be taken for granted. These will be quite different services with quite different cultures and Scotland's focus on domestic defence and civilian contributions may not appeal to or be too great a culture shift for those used to the UK's aggressive overseas stance. The UK will have a wide range of military assets but it is also unlikely that Scotland will want to take a pro-rata share of these since, again, they are orientated towards an offensive position. For example, neither aircraft carriers nor fast jets are much use for territorial defence so 'inheriting' them from the UK would have little point. Scotland would be better to recruit and train the personnel and build up tailored military assets for a Scottish Defence Force over time and thereby get the military we actually need. This would be done over ten years using the annual defence budget and much of it could be procured from Scotland.
What about Scotland's defence in the interim?
It is worth repeating that there is no imminent military threat to Scotland's territory. It is also clear that the rest of the UK will not want any foreign powers to make incursions into Scotland's territory – so as part of negotiations a phased transition deal would be sought. Joining Nato would commit Scotland to military spending higher than it would otherwise be likely to commit (and would change Scotland's defensive posture) so should be a political decision for after independence. But Nato has a programme called Partnership for Peace of which countries like Ireland, Sweden and Finland are members and which offers collective defence. This is a non-controversial step that should be taken during the three year transition period.