BREXIT has changed the context of thinking about the priorities for the security and defence of Scotland. The decisions will be political rather than capacity.
Although there is some continuity in the SNP’s position on defence issues since the 2014 referendum, there has been a rethink regarding what defence equipment Scotland might claim as part of a division of assets. This would allow the Scottish Government to better plan and build a defence force around Scotland’s primary strategic interests rather than trying to use equipment unsuited to the country’s needs.
Continuity is evident in terms of the desire for defence cooperation and the promotion of Scotland taking a role filling regional security gaps. Furthermore, there has been a continued emphasis on membership of collective security organisations such as NATO. This approach may work well to assuage voters’ fears that a security gap would result from independence, and it could play well to an international audience that seeks reassurance that Scotland would prioritise regional defence and security.
Scotland would face a range of potential security challenges, such as the development of a Scottish Defence Force, joining NATO and nuclear disarmament, however none of these seem insurmountable. Furthermore, despite the unpredictability of international relations, Scotland is unlikely to face a direct state-on-state threat to its security. The 2014 proposals demonstrated both a willingness for Scotland to play its role in the world and an understanding of what was at stake.
The questions that would face an independent Scotland in the area of defence and security are thus political ones, rather than whether Scotland has the long-term capacity to defend its citizens or its immediate strategic neighbourhood. Of course, further analysis of defence capabilities is necessary, such as the need to explore the repositioning of NATO and Scotland’s role outwith its immediate strategic ambit, the impact of removing Trident on the SDF’s transition, and the impact of Brexit on an independent Scotland’s defence alliances and rUK relations.
However, just as Brexit has changed the context in which an independent Scotland may pursue its ambitions, equally the UK Government must examine the implications of Brexit for its existing defence plans. The UK will remain a significant military power and will continue to exert influence, but it has lost its authority in Europe and will sit outside many of the discussions relating to EU defence and security. The UK will also not participate in moves to deepen EU cooperation across defence acquisition. The danger for the UK is that despite promises of a cash injection, it is unclear how the UK will maintain its current capabilities and may result in less assets for regional defence and limitations placed on its current global role (Chalmers 2020). Just as the Yes-supporting Scottish Government will be required to demonstrate its competency in defence matters in any second independence referendum, so will the No-supporting UK Government have to demonstrate that Scotland’s defence and security is still best served in the Union after Brexit.
pp 189-197 in Scotland's New Choice; Independence after Brexit