Brexit has reinvigorated Scottish nationalism

victory in a second referendum would bring Ms Sturgeon a similar challenge to the one which Britain faced in 2016, of extracting a nation from a political and economic union without unleashing chaos. The snp’s top brass believe they can avoid such trauma and learn from British errors. The Brexiteers had wildly different ideas about what Brexit meant, made no preparations for negotiations, and refused to anticipate problems such as the border with Ireland. Nationalists, by contrast, are clear about Scotland’s destination as a new eu state, and the Scottish government is studying the eu accession process. In private, senior nationalists are a little more candid these days about the obstacles: the need for a trade border with England, a new currency and a legally complex transition period for the chilly years between leaving one union and joining the other.

Yet many of the technical and legal challenges would look similar to those brought about by Brexit: settling bills, splitting assets, fixing the right to work and study, and access to fishing waters. The union has stood since 1707, so Scotland is far more deeply stitched into the United Kingdom than Britain was into Europe. The hidden systems of daily life—tax collection, immigration controls, electricity distribution—must be unwoven. Unlike Brexit, Scottish negotiations would need to grapple with the fate of nuclear weapons, sovereign debts, and oil and gas reserves. Only once Scotland was a state could accession talks with Europe begin. Unionists warn that, rather than an escape from the turmoil of Brexit, Scotland would be choosing its own “Brexit on steroids”.

Unlike British rule in Ireland, for most of its life the union has rested on Scots’ consent, which they have been, for the most part, happy to grant. Scotland had a stake in Britain’s government, producing prime ministers and cabinet members. Empire and free trade with England made it wealthy and the union did not interfere with Scotland’s church, legal system and universities. Demands for a parliament grew in the 20th century, but calls for independence only came from a noisy fringe.

The pillars of consent were weakened under Margaret Thatcher. She was more willing to impose London rule on Scots in areas such as higher education and local government. The collapse of coal, steel and manufacturing that followed privatisation hit Scotland hard, drove up unemployment, and gave the snp its “anti-Scottish” villain. In the 1980s, the idea that Westminster lacked consent and legitimacy in Scotland gained ground in the Labour Party. Tony Blair hoped the devolved parliament would forestall independence. The snp hoped it would be a stepping stone.

The Labour Party dominated the new parliament but became detached and complacent, and the snp displaced it as the force of the Scottish left. In 2011 it won a majority in the Scottish Parliament. In 2015 it swept Labour’s Scottish mps out of Westminster, too. As the devolved parliament has thrived, so the political news Scots digest has become increasingly different from England’s. Scots migrate south less, so cultural ties weaken. Yet, given the choice in 2014, they still opted to stay.

There the story might have ended, were it not for Brexit. Mr Johnson has chosen a hard exit, ditching the eu’s single market and customs union. He has spurned membership of Erasmus, an exchange programme popular with Scottish students, and an easy migration regime. That has cracked the pillars of consent. Scotland has looked suddenly powerless: the views of its voters, their parliament and their mps in Westminster have counted for little. Brexit cuts deep into the courts and universities, and will make it poorer, as fishermen and bankers encounter trade barriers to Europe where before there were none.